Dr. Brown had a marvellous power of memory, and he was, almost from childhood upwards, a voracious reader of the most indiscriminate material. So much so, that he ran risk at times of his omniscience in so many and widely different subjects being regarded "as bordering on pedantry, and the interest he seemed to take in them as affected." It was poetry, however, that had certainly the greatest attraction for him; his Lectures even blossom and bloom with quotations from the whole circle of verse, both classical and modern; "and his common-place books are filled with copious extracts from French, Italian, German, Spanish poetry." To keep him at rest "during a very dangerous illness before he was five, an immense volume of old ballads was procured for him, and he continued quietly in bed till he had got the greater part of them by heart." Spending his holidays at the house of his uncle when a schoolboy, "he regularly read through a copy of Shakespeare in it." Despite of both ballads and Shakespeare, however, despite, too, of living during the very fervour of the second great outburst of inspired poetry in England,-that, namely, on the part of the Wordsworths, Scotts, Coleridges, Campbells, Moores, Byrons, it was Pope that was for Brown (as for Byron indeed), par excellence, still the poet! While in his Lectures he has only two quotations from Shakespeare, he has no less than thirty-eight from Pope. "Pope was the model whom Dr. Brown," says his biographer, "had most frequently before his eye; he often said that every poet ought continually to read him." The "Imitations of Horace," doubtless, are still to be enthusiastically named excellent; but I fancy most tastes, be the reason where it may, are too dull nowadays to be kindled to more than faint praise (still very sincere, nevertheless) for Essays on Criticism, or Essays on Man, for Eloisas to Abelards, or even Rapes of the Lock. His Homer keeps

of

its place; but the reason lies fully in Homer, and very uncertainly in Pope. Brown evidently was of another way of thinking; and even for his biographer we may say no less. His Paradise of Coquettes, says the latter, has "placed the name of Brown in the playful species of epic next to that of Pope." "It is worthy of remark," he adds elsewhere, "that Pope, whom Brown as a poet most resembles, was distinguished by his filial virtues." Brown, besides his Paradise of Coquettes, has any number poems-Wanderers in Norway, Bowers of Spring, Agnes, War Fiends, and what not; but despite quantity and even quality (for with "correctness and elegance" there are "occasional fine thoughts"), "the poetry of Dr. Brown," say the critics of the day, "is now utterly forgotten." If this then be so, we are apt rather to admire all these Popian references on the part of Dr. Welsh. The contemporary halo (such halo as hovers before Hume) may have long faded from most of the works of Pope; but Pope is still Pope-at the very head, namely, of our poets of the second rank; and one cannot but feel a certain sense of discrepancy when even such a name as Brown is placed side by side with such another as Pope. So it is we smile when we read in Welsh, " In delicacy of perception, in correctness, in wit, in melody, he (Brown) was at least equal to that great genius (Pope); in refinement and temper far superior; in condensation and practical wisdom, the palm "-magnanimously!—the "palm!" 'must unquestionably be given to Pope!"

But Dr. Brown, if a great poet to Dr. Welsh, is still to him an even greater philosopher. Dr. Brown, he decides, "may be pronounced at least equal, and in subtlety of intellect and powers of analysis as superior, to any metaphysician that ever existed." This, indeed, that he was "the first of modern metaphysicians, has been confirmed by public opinion." "The discovery of

those principles by which his writings are distinguished from those of preceding philosophers will constitute an era in the history of metaphysical science." As Dr. Welsh, with the "palm" in his hand, was troubled whether he should give it to Pope or to Brown, so, even when expressing his amazement at "the marvellous display of profound and original thought," "classical finish," "matchless ingenuity," "eloquence," etc. etc., on the part of this "the subtlest metaphysician of the age," he seems obliged to admit, " Hume was nearly as acute!" but then, as he triumphantly remembers, "with all his ingenuity, he (Hume) could not rear a consistent system!" These two names, Pope and Hume, are even categories, two remarkable leading categories, during the second advent of poetry and romance in England: both lay at the indignant heart of the murmurers and malcontents of the sort of small Fronde then! But to Dr. Welsh, while his Lectures, "for metaphysical acuteness, profound and liberal views, refined taste, varied learning, and philosophical eloquence, may challenge comparison with any work that was ever published," it is still "An Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect" that constitutes for Brown his capital achievement. Even "some of the notes there settle, in the most masterly way, questions that for ages had been a subject of contention among philosophers;" while, as for the Inquiry itself, it has been "matured and perfected into one of the most elegant and profound works on the philosophy of mind that has appeared in modern times," -nay, it must be regarded "as the first perfect work on a metaphysical subject, and as fixing an era in the science to which it belongs, as much as was done by the Principia!"

Well, that at all events is certain, that in the whole. history of philosophy there is, probably, not one single

eircumstance more astonishing than the belief in regard to causality that seems, in a few years after the death of Hume, to have obtained in Scotland in consequence of that philosopher's peculiar findings in his discussion of the problem. Brown it was who formulated this belief, and to the following effect :-Causation means no more than "invariableness of antecedence." Power is "only another word for expressing abstractly and briefly the antecedence itself and the invariableness of the relation." Power, that is, so far as it shall be held to be synonymous with "efficiency," is altogether denied. There is "invariableness," and that is the "efficiency:" if more or other efficiency is wanted than invariableness, then efficiency there is none. "The feeling that one object will never appear without being followed by anotherthat is "the essence of our idea of efficiency." It is in this reference that, as I remark elsewhere, Burton has, in his Life of Hume, these astounding words: "This refers to the notion, which now may be termed obsolete, at least in philosophy, of an inherent power in the cause to produce the effect!" These words were printed in 1846! We may say, then, that the belief in question has had, to use the dialect, its "votaries" in Scotland, actually, for the best part of a century! It is Hume that is credited with the proposition; and there is no such proposition in Hume. Hume knows, and never denies, that a cause has efficacy, efficiency, power to produce its effect; he knows, and never denies, that there is a reason for the necessity between them: he only asks, Can you, philosophically, point it out? No doubt, his conclusion is, that it-the reason- -can not be pointed out; but then, that is all: he asks for no more. Give him that, and he confidently marches up with it to the very entrenchments of "superstition;" but he is perfectly aware all the time that a cause has efficacy to produce

A is not B.

its effect. The cause is the cause, the effect is the effect; the effect is not the cause, and the cause is not the effect. The cause is A; but the effect is B. And What binds B to A-why does B always follow A? We do not see what "binds:" we only find," says Hume, "that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears." No doubt, as I say, Hume, for his own purpose, took full advantage of the dilemma. And it was very absurd that Reid, Oswald, and Beattie kept asseverating that there was a connection, that there was a necessity. Hume never disputed that; he only asked for the reason and not one of them ever attempted to produce it. Of course, Hume's illustration is very unfortunate for himself; for the reason of the connection, the reason of the necessity was very apparent as regards the billiard balls. The problem did not lie either in the ball A or in the ball B; but it did lie in the single thing, the motion between them. Perhaps Hume did not think of that; but he did think, as "instinct," he confessed, taught him, that there was a "natural" necessity, that is, a natural reason in the whole business. And I do think he would have been astonished that Stewart, Brown, and the rest made as though they took him at more than his word, and that there was no power, efficacy, efficiency-nothing but invariableness in the relation of causality as such. Nay, I do believe he would even have been astonished at Reid in thinking himself obliged to admit that his (Hume's) reasonings applied to" inanimate," but not to "intelligent causes." Hume, I doubt not, knew perfectly well that in inanimate causes there were no exceptions. A man chooses for his purposes an agent, an agent that is adapted to them, a knife to cut his meat, a hammer to drive his nail, a