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the great, stout, simple sort of Dandy Dinmont Scotchman that he was! And I hope now you will go and look at that house, the old-fashioned one at the corner of St. Andrew Square, that, in St. David Street, stood alone at first. Hume himself had it built, and he lived in it the last five or six years of his life. Go and look at it, and, as you look, believe that, whatever his shortcomings and deficiencies, it is still with love, and respect, and gratitude that we ought to think always and at any time of the "good David."

REESE LIERARY

UN-VERITY

CALFOONA

GIFFORD LECTURE THE FIFTEENTH.

Transition, Hume to Kant-Effect of Kant on natural theologyThe centre of Kant's thought-Hume led to this-Causal necessity-That necessity objective-Still in matters of factRelations of ideas-Hume on one side, Kant on the other, of the dilemma-Hume quite as Reid, on natural necessityBut what the explanation to intellectual insight - Synthetic addition--Analytic implication-Change-Kant's explanation is, There are à priori syntheses native to the mind-The whole Kantian machinery in a sentence-Time and space---The twelve categories and the three ideas A toy house -- A peculiar magic lantern-A psychology- A metaphysic-Analysis of the syllogism for the ideas-Simple apprehension missed-An idea-The ideal-The teleological proof.

THERE can be no straighter or nearer transition than from David Hume to Immanuel Kant. The latter does himself claim the former as his direct and immediate predecessor. This is true, too, not only in the reference, generally, to philosophy, but in that, particularly, to the special subject presently before us. Perhaps not in English, but certainly in translations, Kant (very evidently) is perfectly familiar with Hume's main doctrines in regard to the existence of a God; nor do his own results differ much from those of his forerunner, otherwise than in weight and authority. It was principally because of these results, namely, that the Alleszermalmender, the everything - to - pieces - pounding Kant, received his title. Kant's countrymen, unlike their neighbours, the French, are not reputed to be particularly versatile; nevertheless it seems certain that, not

THE CENTRE OF KANT'S THOUGHT.

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long after reading his three chapters on the impossibility of each of the three proofs for the existence of God, most of them who were at least of the same guild with Kant, suddenly ceased, or were even ashamed, to mention the subject. For them the whole science of Natural Theology had, in a moment, passed silently into the limbo of the lost. And so it is that it is of greater importance for us to put to scrutiny the relative views of Kant than even those of Hume. At all to effect this with any satisfaction, however, requires that we should preliminarily know at least the spirit of the system from which these views naturally take origin. That may sound ominous; but I do not know that what is concerned may not be put simply and intelligibly enough.

The centre of Kant is, to say so, the à priorithose elements of knowledge, those elements of the ordinary perception of things, that are native and proper to the mind itself, even before, or independently and in anticipation of, any actual experience of these things. That is what is meant by pure reason. Our minds shall be at birth, not, as with Locke, so many tabulae rasae, so many mere blank sheets for things to write themselves into, so many empty bags or sacks for things to occupy; but, on the contrary, they shall be, already, beforehand, rich quarries, filled, as it were, with the needful handles and cues of all things. What led Kant to this was Hume. Hume, as we know, took the cause as one thing and the effect as another; and holding them out so, apart, challenged any man to show any principle of union between them. Without experience of the fact, it is impossible to tell that gunpowder will explode, or a loadstone attract. Consequently it is only by the custom of experience that we know the effect of the one on iron, or the consequence on the other of a spark. Kant was deeply impressed by such examples and the general challenge of Hume. He admits himself that he brooded over the problem concerned for "at least twelve years;" and of that brooding I think it is possible to detect traces as early as the year 1766, or fifteen years before the publication of his Kritik of Pure Reason. What, in the end, prevented Kant from agreeing with Hume in his rationale custom, was perception of the nature of the necessity which was involved in the problem. That necessity Kant saw was not a subjective, but an objective necessity. The necessity by which, when I think A, I cannot help thinking also B, C, D; or when I think 1, then also 2, 3, 4-that necessity, as being only one of habitual association in me, is a subjective necessity. But, when I think of an eclipse of the sun as following the intervention of the moon, I do not think of a necessity subjective, a necessity for no other reason than habitual association of my own. On the contrary, I think of a necessity objective, of a necessity that exists independently of me, and without any reference to me or my feelings in any way. In short, I know that the moon, coming between me and the light, casts its shadow upon me, and must cast its shadow upon me; which is an event and an entire resultant necessity, utterly independent of me, and of any way in which I may be pleased to regard it. In the same way, when I see a bridge overthrown by a river in flood, it is impossible for me to think the necessity involved to proceed from custom-to depend on the influence of custom. I cannot think that necessity a subjective necessity in me, but, on the contrary, an objective necessity in the facts themselves. This, then, is what occurred to Kant in face of the contention of Hume. But then he was obliged to admit at the same time that Hume was right in pointing out that all examples of causality were but matters of fact, in regard

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to which, as matters of fact, we know that they are, or are as they are, but not that they must be. Cork floats, coal burns, etc. etc.; we know the fact or the event; but we did not know the fact or the event in any case until we tried it; then and then only we knew that the propositions, cork floats, coal burns, were true; but we did not know, and we know not now, that they must be true. Cork might not float, coal might not burn: we see no necessity for cork to float or for coal to burn. But all examples of causality are just such facts as the matters of fact that cork floats or coal burns; and yet the proposition concerned in every one single example of causality is as necessary, as apodictically necessary, as any proposition dependent on what are called relations of ideas, and which, accordingly, is intuitively known to carry or involve the necessity in question. It was precisely this peculiarity that struck both Hume and Kant. Both saw that all examples of causality were only known by experience; and both saw that they all brought with them a suggestion of necessity. Both, then, further, immediately asked how was this? for both knew that experience was only competent to say this thing or that thing is so, not this thing or that thing must be so. But both, putting the same question, in the same circumstances, and with the same knowledge, came to an answer, each, which was the contradictory of the other. Hume said, As it is an affair of experience alone, it can be no affair of necessity. On the contrary, said Kant, As it is an affair of necessity, it can be no affair of experience alone. Hume had no objection whatever to the necessity in question being regarded by us as a natural necessity. He did himself regard it as a natural necessity. Neither did he object to the reference of it, as a natural necessity, to instinct. On the contrary, as a natural necessity, he did himself so refer it. And Reid, consequently, in the case, might

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