SOLITARY HOURS.

(Continued from col. 1094, Vol. IX.) No. XXVI. Evidences of Christianity. -Evidence arising from Miracles.

"If the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves to sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts; for they were such as came under the observation of their senses. And

though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to inforin themselves whether they were true or not, and give equal proof of their believing them to be true."-Butler's Analogy of Religion.

THE miracles which were wrought in attestation of the Gospel, constitute an unanswerable argument for its truth. This the opponents of Christianity have sensibly felt; and hence the most distinguished among them have concentrated all the energies of their minds, in order to counteract the favourable impression which these miracles are calculated to produce.

A miracle has been justly defined to be a deviation from, or suspension of, the laws of nature. Now, of such phenomena we are furnished with a variety of instances in the New Testament. The deaf are represented as having been made to hear the blind to see-the lame to walk-the dead to live-with many other works of an equally miraculous nature;-all of which are said to have been wrought by Christ and his apostles. Now, the ostensible purpose for which these miracles were performed was, to attest the truth of the mission with which Jesus was entrusted.

The question, therefore, which solicits discussion is, whether or not we ought to credit the reality or actual performance of these miracles. It will be readily admitted by every consistent deist, that the Supreme Being is invested with sufficient power for the accomplishment of those miracles which are represented d as having occurred in the primitive days of Christianity.

Now, it would certainly constitute an unprecedented intellectual anomaly, to admit that the Supreme Being is possessed of this almighty power, and that he has called nature into existence, and has appointed the laws by which she shall be regulated and governed, and yet deny his adequacy to effect a temporary suspension of, or a deviation from, those laws, when requisite to answer any of his purposes.

cepting the usual course of nature, the question naturally arises, how far is it probable that such interruption should take place? In answer to this, it may be sufficient to remark, that as the Divine Being is infinite in wisdom, he must have a sufficient reason for all his measures; and, whenever a sufficiently important end is to be gained by his deviating from his usual course of procedure, in the administration of the laws of nature, we have every ground to expect that such deviation should take place.

Now, if, as has been shewn in a former article, mankind stood in the utmost need of a divine revelation, and if such a revelation were to be vouchsafed to them, it would consequently follow, that it was an object of the hightest importance that this revelation should be duly credited by those to whom it was communicated. And in proportion to the importance of assenting to the truth and divine origin of this revelation, we might reasonably expect would be the force and conclusiveness of that testimony by which it was to be attested.

Now, we know of no species of evidence so convincing to the human mind as the open performance of miracles; and as the revelation in question was necessarily of such a nature as to require the strongest testimony, in order to warrant mankind in giving their assent to it; it therefore follows, that there existed the highest degree of probability, that the Divine being would invest those with whom he entrusted the delivery of the Christian message with the power of working miracles.

We are not, however, left to rest in the possibility, or even probability, of miracles having been performed in attestation of the important truths of Christianity: we affirm it is as certain as moral evidence can make it, that those miracles recorded in the New Testament, and attributed to Christ and his apostles, were actually wrought by them.

In order to our belief in the occurrence of events, it is necessary that the witnesses, on whose testimony we are called to exercise our faith in these events, be men of sound judgment-that they have had a sufficient opportunity of knowing, whether or not those events actually took place-that their character for honesty be undeniableand that they had no temptation to bear false witness.

Let us for a moment apply these criterions to the miracles recorded in the New

Testament.

The evangelists and apostles were men of sound judgment. Of the truth of this,

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of modern times have accused them of a defective judgment, they have never been able to adduce evidence which could have even the appearance of substantiating this charge. The uniform history of the writers of the New Testament, furnishes us with indisputable proof that they were men of penetration ation and solid judgment. Notwithstanding the numerous, diversified, and often-times intricate questions, which came under their consideration, we know of no conclusion at which they arrived, that was not agreeable to the dictates of right

reason.

So far from being under the habitual, or even temporary guidance of a disordered intellect, the invariable tenor of their con. duct evinces that they were men of peculiarly quick discernment and strong judgment. Inveterate as was the animosity with which they were regarded by the generality of their countrymen, and many as were the accusations which were preferred against them, we hardly, if ever, hear an insinuation thrown out intending to imply their want of a sound intellect. On the contrary, we are presented, in the course of their history, with several instances of their decided opponents conceding to them the possession, in an eminent degree, of a discerning mind and sober judgment. There can be no doubt, therefore, that they were duly qualified, so far as their judg. ment was concerned, to decide whether those works which were attributed to Jesus, and those they represented as having been wrought by themselves, were, or were not, actually performed.

But, perhaps, perhaps, it

may be said that the New Testament writers might have been possessed of a sufficiently sound judgment, and yet, for want of the necessary knowledge of circumstances connected with the subject, their testimony may be erroneous. To this we reply, that, the Apostles and Evangelists had sufficient opportunity of knowing whether those miraculous events, recorded in the New Testament, did actually take place or not. They do not affirm their occurrence on the testimony of others; but were themselves eye-witnesses of all they narrated; and, in some cases, were the instruments by whom the events in question were produced. And there was no possibility, from the nature of these

chargeable with the fearfully aggravated crime of asserting that to be true, which they knew to be false.

The Apostles and Evangelists were men of unimpeachable integrity; and therefore, their testimony regarding the reality of the miracles of the New Testament, may be depended on. There is something in the is something simple and artless manner in which the miracles are narrated, which carries along with it, in the estimation of every unprejudiced mind, an unanswerable proof that the New Testament writers were only narrating what they themselves believed to be truth, and nothing but the truth. Had they been affirming the reality of miracles, when, in fact, they knew that no such miracles had ever been performed, we should have readily perceived an evidently laboured attempt to be extremely cautious in all they advanced, in order, if possible, to prevent the reader from detecting the falsehood of their averments.

It may be urged by our opponents, that "even on the supposition that the New Testament historians were previously men of integrity, yet, in consequence of the force of temptation, they may, in the particular instance before us, have forfeited their former character for sterling honesty."We readily admit that men, whose previous characters for integrity were totally beyond the reach of suspicion, have been frequently led, by the power of temptation, to deviate from their usual rectitude of conduct. In the present case, however, there is not the slightest ground to suppose that there was any forfeiture of that character for honesty, previously possessed by the Evangelists and Ap Apostles. Instead of hav

ing the least temptation to assert falsehood, they had every consideration, in the instance before us, to deter them from the commission of such a crime. They had no prospect either of gain or glory by the assertion of the miracles referred to. On the contrary, they incurred by their conduct in the whole matter, the contempt and derision of the overwhelming majority of their countrymen; and procured procured for themselves the greatest privations and sufferings, and, in many cases, the pains of martyrdom.

This, however, we wish it to be observed, was not in consequence of their countrymen regarding their assertions, in reference to the actual performance of those

to their reality. The miracles referred to, came under the cognizance of their several senses; so that if, in affirming that these miracles were actually performed, they were asserting a falsehood, there is no other

readily admitted the actual occurrence of the miracles in question; but because they looked upon the religion of Jesus as the work of Satan, and Christ and his apostles as the instruments whom he had employed

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for the purpose of propagating it in the world. If, then, the New Testament historians, so far from having any temptation to assert the reality of the miracles, and the purpose for which they were performed, had every earthly inducement to deter them from making these assertions, it consequently follows, that their testimony is entitled to the highest degree of credit.

But, in adverting to the satisfactory evidence with which we are furnished regarding the reality of the New Testament miracles, we deem it of the utmost importance to our argument, that we take particularly into the account the certain fact, that we are not called on to rest our faith on the reality of these miracles on the mere testimony of the Evangelists and Apostles; but have virtually to the same effect the testimony of thousands of the enemies of Christianity, who lived at the period at which those miracles were performed.

It is an indisputable fact, that the Evangelists and Apostles began their ministrations among their own countrymen, and in the identical place which was the scene of the miraculous events referred to, and immediately on their occurrence. Now, many of those miracles were performed in the presence of thousands, and were of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of any optical illusion being practised in the matter;-so that, independently of the strong additional testimony regarding the reality of the performance of these miracles, derived from the circumstance of immense numbers of the Jews being brought, by their means, to renounce Judaism and embrace Christianity, we have equally conclusive testimony in the circumstance of those Jews who rejected the Messiah and his religion, never venturing to contradict or dispute the actual occurrence of those miracles.

position, that "as miracles are contrary to experience, it follows that no testimony whatever is sufficient to establish their actual occurrence." Let us examine how far this position is defensible.

Were the principle of experience to be regarded as the only legitimate test of truth, then the quantity of knowledge individually possessed by mankind, would be extremely scanty indeed. The range of individual human experience is so very limited, that, in this case, we should all be in a state of ignorance considerably greater than that of the most barbarous savages now in existence; for a great proportion of the little information they possess, is derived from their faith in the testimony of those around them.

According to the principle laid down by Mr. Hume, we have no sufficient reason to believe in any event whatever recorded in history. We have been told by others, and Mr. Hume has affirmed it as an undoubted truth, that a nobleman denominated the duke of Marlborough existed about the commencement of the eighteenth century, and that distinguished success attended his martial enterprises. Now, of the truth of these circumstances, though universally acknowledged, I cannot, in consequence of my not being in existence at the period referred to, have any experience. My belief in the matter rests entirely on the testimony of others; and yet that belief is as strong as it is in the fact of my holding a pen in my hand at the present moment. Were Mr. Hume's principles, however, founded in truth, neither I, nor any other individual of the present day, could have any legitimate data on which to ground our belief in the facts referred to; and on the same principle we maintain, that no credit whatever ought to be attached to the statements contained in this author's celebrated history of England.

It may, perhaps, be urged in opposition to this reasoning, that "the greater proportion of the circumstances contained in Hume's history, which he avers to be facts, are only what may be said to be the common occurrences of life, and consequently do not require such force of evidence, in order to our regarding them as truth, as those events or circumstances require, which are deviations from the common course of nature." This admitted; but we do not conceive that it materially affects the case; for while we concede that there is a greater degree of presumption, a priori, for

ON LATENT INSANITY.

To man, the mind of man is of infinite importance; and to say nothing of its improvements, every one possessing intellectual powers, should be acquainted with the causes that so often produce the most deplorable effects upon those powers. It is not sufficient that a few professional men should study mental diseases; for such is their nature, that they may have made fatal progress before any, but those affected, are at all apprised of their approach: and the best chance of success, both as to prevention and cure, can only be expected, when those visited by the previous symptoms do themselves know something of their nature, and the means of prevention. This I have repeatedly urged; but so long as palpably visible insanity is preposterously treated, as it certainly is in many instances, it is not likely that obscure symptoms shall meet with judicious treatment, either medical or

moral.

While thousands of deeds of horror are committed by those who are acknowledged to have been insane at the time, tens of thousands are perpetrated under its influence: the disease being latent, or doubt. ful, in the minds of others.

The great cause of obscurity in what may be called latent insanity, arises from the disease being thought disgraceful. If those afflicted, or in danger of an attack, were as ready to speak of their symptoms, as of the symptoms of approaching gout, insanity might be generally prevented under skilful practice. But it is as vain to expect the patient to reason correctly under a paroxysm of mental disorder, as to prevail upon those to speak truly of their symptoms who have any idea that approaching insanity is suspected. It would be a great point gained, if those in actual

danger could be brought to a secret conviction that they are liable to it. The proofs of latent insanity, with which thousands are afflicted, can only be known to themselves, and the marks of visible insanity are confined to the looks, the words, and the actions; and these are often equivocal, for the disease being partial and intermittent, there may be a total absence of any appearance of it, both in the words and actions, during what are called the lucid intervals; and though the looks are a more steady and certain criterion, yet they cannot be acted upon as evidence. I have seen numbers in my time, whose looks were a strong indication of mental disorder, to whom the disease had never been imputed. And, indeed, I have known others whose conduct and language were plain proofs of insanity, (and of their being afflicted, I have had secret evidence on which I could depend,) to whom it had not been imputed, except by those who had made the complaint a study. We have now an instance of this in a man of blasphemous notoriety.

That the subject is of vast importance, is proved by the great numbers who are visited by insanity, and the deplorable proportion of those who do not recover from it, and the numberless acts that are committed under its latent influences, in the face of evidence that the disease might almost always be prevented, (and when not prevented, it might almost always be perfectly cured,) if proper measures were timely resorted to, and duly persisted in.

That all who have the common imaginations, and sensibilities, and mental energies, of human nature, are liable to insanity, none will dispute who understand the disease; for, in fact, it is only the excess of what we all experience, with the exception of those who are under the influence of extreme apathy or afflictive idiotism. If, then, all are liable to this dreadful malady to whom life is valuable, it is a great blessing, that a knowledge of its approach, and of the means of prevention, is attainable; yet how few seem to wish for this knowledge. People will talk of the horrors of insanity; but did they truly know them, as those in my situation must know them, surely they would not fail to cultivate a knowledge of the means of preventing its attacks, for themselves, and those near and dear to them in life.

To me it appears an highly imperative duty in all, to acquire all the information possible upon the subject, and to get rid of those prejudices and that ignorance, which render the study of it so repulsive to the feelings. How can those who do not