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PREFACE.

THE present volume has grown up and taken shape under the chastening influences of College teaching. No teacher of Logic would wish to underestimate the value of the education he receives from his students; and since my education has for nine years been advancing along these lines, my claim to have learnt Logic through teaching it may be accepted in sincerest good faith. A first and most grateful acknowledgment is due to my many fellow-workers at Hampstead (at the New College Centre, and at Westfield College) who by their doubts, difficulties, criticisms, and suggestions have had so much to do with the shaping of this book.

But there is a still more intimate sense in which the book is the work of many rather than of one. From the time when it was first decided to reconstruct the College lectures with a view to publication, I was privileged to enjoy the invaluable sympathy and assistance of Professor G. F. Stout. Professor Stout most kindly consented to read through these lectures, and returned them to me shortly afterwards accompanied by a small volume of criticisms. It would be hard to exaggerate the value of these criticisms. On such fundamental heads as the Laws of Thought, the interrelation of Categorical, Disjunctive, and Hypothetical Propositions, and the essential meaning of the Disjunctive and Hypothetical Judgments, the substance of Professor Stout's contentions was adopted, and will be easily recognized by all who are familiar with the Professor's logical views. Many extracts from these criticisms will be found in the present volume. Professor Stout has also allowed me to look through a large part of his own Class lectures in Logic, and has helped me in many other ways, not least through certain conversations which we have had together over fundamental logical principles.

Miss Klein's collaboration dates from the first revision of the work-from the spring of 1905. Since that date, every change in the treatment and the reconstructions have been drastic-has been subjected to the friendliest but most unsparing criticism. No point of divergence between us but has been thoroughly discussed, and transmuted into a point of common agreement.

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If, in addition to the reading of the proofs, the verifying of the quotations and the elaboration of the scientific illustrations and allusions, I may single out two respects in which Miss Klein's co-operation has been particularly valuable, I would mention her revision of the work in the interest of consistency, and her revision of it in the interest of clear expression. To show the importance of these revisions, it would be necessary to publish the original draft side by side with the final product; but as this course is not practicable, I can only assure the reader that, however he may suffer from the defects of the present treatise, his sufferings, but for these revisions, would have been incalculably worse. It has, indeed, become increasingly evident to me, as the work proceeded, that it could no longer be honestly regarded as one man's work. The original draft was the work of one; the reconstruction is the work of three.

With regard to the help derived from published treatises on Logic, my heaviest obligation has been to the works of Mill and of Sigwart, to Professor Bosanquet's 'Logic,' and to Mr. Joseph's 'Introduction to Logic.' My indebtedness to Mr. Joseph is indirect rather than direct, our points of view being quite different. But though I have been unable to assimilate either the Aristotelian or the Baconian elements which figure so prominently in Mr. Joseph's treatment, I have every reason to be grateful that his work appeared early enough to allow of my making full use of it in revising my own. Among other works which have been particularly useful to me, I would specially mention Professor Minto's treatise, 'Logic, Inductive and Deductive' (notably the Introduction to Book II., dealing with the Logic of Science), and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick's books, notably 'The Use of Words in Reasoning '; but I have also profited much by the treatises of Dr. Keynes, Dr. Mellone, Professor Carveth Read, Mr. St. George Stock, Dr. Venn, and Professor Welton. I would, in addition, gratefully acknowledge the help given me by Miss Strudwick, of the Goldsmiths' College, New Cross, in connexion with the scientific illustrations on pp. 59-62. In conclusion, I would add that if I have appeared to ignore the work of such writers as Professor Dewey or Dr. Schiller, it is not through any lack of sympathy or appreciation. I am, indeed, persuaded that the drift of the present work is convergent with that of the Pragmatic Reformation, and that the stress laid on relevancy is a vital bond of union between ourselves and the Pragmatists. But the central contentions of Pragmatism concern the Logic of Experience, and cannot, therefore, be appropriately or adequately treated in the pages that follow. We hope to consider them in a later work.

The present volume aspires to be the first part of a 'complete' treatise on Logic, of which the second will deal, or attempt to deal, with the Logical Problem in its more philosophical aspect. Some

brief indication as to this programme will be found in the Introduction. Here it may be enough to state that the Religious Idealism in which the author's own conviction culminates seems to him to call imperatively for a frank and fruitful co-operation between the Idealism of the Hegelian School on the one hand, and the Psychologism of the Pragmatic and Genetic movements on the other. In attempting this reconciliation, so far as it is relevant to the requirements of a logical treatise, the author ventures to hope that he may be found working in the service of that liberating movement in Philosophy which, in his own mind, is centrally associated with the work and personality of Professor

Eucken.

The promise of a sequel is no doubt a convenient shield for sheltering an author-though, indeed, only temporarily from any charge of incompleteness in his treatment. I would claim this shelter as regards the discussion of the principles of Mathematics in their logical bearing. I hope to deal with this important problem in the sequel.

I am much more doubtful with regard to the general problem of Symbolic Logic. Whether, in postponing the discussion of this department of Logic, I am or am not shelving its consideration altogether, I am not now prepared to say. In no case would I contest the interest and importance of Symbolic Logic; but whether the limitations of my programme-or of my own powers-may not render its discussion irrelevant or impracticable-is, perhaps, a pardonable question.

The distinctive feature of the present volume will, I think, be found in the dominating position assigned to the idea of relevancy. The fundamental concepts of Truth and Reality have been defined in the light of this category, and the principle of Fidelity to Relevant Fact has been adopted as the master-key to all the main positions, including the central problem of a Formal treatment, and its relation to a material treatment of Logic. I would also draw attention to the distinction between the functions respectively assigned to the Laws of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle. This distinction will be found to be directly connected with that between a Formal and a material treatment of the logical problem.

In conclusion, I would gratefully acknowledge the work done by Miss Klein in the framing of the Index. The Index is her work, and she alone is responsible for it.

CHARDONNE SUR VEVEY,
May 10, 1908.

W. R. BOYCE GIBSON.

ERRATA.

Page 337, line 30, instead of 'Neptune's irregularities,' read 'The irregularities of Uranus.'

Page 404, line 27, instead of 'Agreement,' read 'Difference.'

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