having drawn my faith in the Trinity from Plato, the B late 1 late in the second century. As to the date of a word I cannot see it to be of any fort of consequence, if the idea to which it is annexed be but conveyed by it. If we had not been termed Christians by the people of Antioch, and that the professors of Christ's religion had, as yet, continued without a name, would pofterity deny the existence of Christianity, or dispute the propriety of the term, because it was of the eighteenth century? The word Christians was equally applicable to us before we were called by it at Antioch, as after; and the word Trinity was equally applicable to the three persons of the Godhead before mankind agreed to call them by it, as after. But if the name only were in debate, I should be but very little concerned about it, the Unity of the Godhead, and the Divinity of the three Persons being allowed, I care not by what appellation they are called: But I am forry to fee, at a time when I believe the doctrine is what Mr. Lindsey would confute, that he is weak enough to conceive that a disapprobation of the name will in the least contribute to his purpose; for either he must conceive that it does, and so trifle; or not conceiving so, acknowledge that he is talking about words only; and furely nothing can be more uncandid than such a process. He must assuredly know that his delicate conduct will procure him more readers than he could with modesty have hoped for, had his book been put forth without such a concomitant circumstance; and also that, in the multitude of his readers, understandings of every fize must be numbered; and it is therefore impossible but he must have foreseen that some will be of so contracted dimensions, as to reckon the diflike of the word among the arguments against the substance named. To what purpose else than that of deception is it advanced, that to Luther "the word Trinity 1 Trinity sounds oddly, and is of human invention, and that it were better to call Almighty God, God, than Trinity." And that Calvin says "I like not this prayer, O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, it favours of barbarism." Are Luther and Calvin among the opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity? No such thing; and Mr. Lindsey himself shall tell you that they were well known and warm contenders for what is called the doctrine of the Trinity, though they expressed fuch a diflike of the word itself. I cannot fee his inference, unless he would infinuate that a dislike of the word, is a dislike of the doctrine, and therefore avail himself of the authority of these " virtuous holy" men: But that authority is altogether against him, as himself acknowledges; and Calvin, by a horrible instance, proved the fincerity of his belief in the Trinity, for he actually brought Servetus to the stake for oppofing it. If this delicacy of Calvin, concerning the barbarifm of a term, be admitted in argument, I see no reason wherefore we should reject a classic mythology; or why, when we speak of our Saviour's incarnation, we should not use the words with which Erasmus ridiculed the faftidious wits of Leo's polished court, and say, " E coelo defcendit filius Jovis." In short, I can fee no reason wherefore we should not, like Leo himself, pass judgment upon the whole of the sacred writings, declare them barbarous, and never read the Bible for fear of spoiling our taste. And with respect to what is said concerning Luther, however it may be asserted that he prefers the calling upon God, by the name of God, to the calling upon him by the name Trinity, it is deducible from this assertion, that he looked upon the two words as synonimous, and confequently that the word Trinity, though it might found oddly, was expressive of the idea, which he chooses rather to express by the B2 term i term God; a term perhaps more pleasing to his ear. 1 Thus far I have written, not with a view of derogating from the real worth of Mr. Lindsey, nor of lessening the value of such worth in the eyes of mankind, but with a purpose of preventing the merits of the honest confcientious man being carried over to his cause, and concluded to be the merits of his argument. I am myself defirous that the favour which is due to his virtue should attend his person, but not be converted into partiality for his cause. I feek not to obtain the favour of the public to myself, but their unprejudiced ear, and that men should yield their convictions to truth only, and not take prepossessions for conviction. Preliminaries being, I hope, settled, I shall now no longer withhold my reader from that line of argument, by which alone it seems to me possible to inquire into the subject before us, and by the pursuit of which, I trust, I shall be able to evince the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Chrift. : CHAP On the Province of Reason, with Respect to its Enquiry M into Scripture Truths. R. Lindsey commences with an assertion, that "the unlearned reader fees at once, that the God who made him, and whom he is to adore, is one, without multiplicity or divifion, even as he knoweth himself to be one, being one person and not many;" and on this position he proceeds to argue. If Mr. Lindsey means by the unlearned reader, the reader of his book, who has never read the Bible, perhaps he is right; but I believe that every reader, who has read the Bible, will see the fallacy of this great foundation of all that follows in confutation of a trinity of Persons in the Godhead. On a fuppofition that nature has fuggefted, and philofophy refined upon the suggeftion of a God, I do not doubt that natural religion might acquiefce in this assertion; but are we to come to the scriptures, which all men allow to be the foundation of our religion, with a religion already formed, and to judge of the revelation made by the God of truth, according to its correspondence with our previous perfuafions? Are we to exalt our own reason, and fay, that t it is a standard whereby to measure the infinite extents of power and wisdom? or are we to set bounds to infinity, and annihilate all that stretches beyond the grasp of our limited comprehenfion? The short-fighted man may, with equal truth, and equal wisdom, deny the existence of all objects beyond the reach of his vision. And yet one of these consequences must be inferred from the afsertion, either that our reason is infinite |